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The Battle of Murten
The Invasion of Charles the Bold
and the Survival of the Swiss States
by Albert Winkler
Frequent warfare was a harsh political reality in central Europe in the
late Middle Ages as ambitious states tried to extend their power and
influence by attacking and subjugating other territories. As a result of
this frequent aggression, success on the battlefield was necessary for
the survival and independence of many nations and peoples, including
the Swiss Confederation. The most critical threat to the existence of the
Swiss alliance in the fifteenth century was the invasion inl476 by Charles
the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, one of the most powerful rulers in Europe.
In two stunning victories, Granson (Grandson in German), and, most
importantly, Murten (Morat in French), 1 the Swiss assured the survival
of the Confederation, and these impressive feats of arms also propelled
the Swiss states to the status of major players in international affairs for
a short time. 2
This contest was also a contrast in ideologies because it pitted the
monarchical and largely feudal duchy of Burgundy against the Swiss states
that were predominately republics and democracies. In a broader sense,
the victory of the Confederate foot soldiers contributed to a revolution

1
Many of the places mentioned in this article are on the linguistic frontiers of
Switzerland between the German and French-speaking areas, and most of them are
known by the spelling in either language. In this paper, the locations in the Frenchspeaking areas will be referred to by their French spelling and those in the Germanspeaking areas by their German spelling.
2
A large collection of sources is Gottlieb Ochsenbein ed. Die Urkunden der
Belagerung und Schlacht von Murten. Im Auftrage des Festcomites auf die vierte
Siikularfeier am. 22 ]uni I 876, (Freiburg: Bielmann, 1876). Hereafter cited as 0. This
work fails to include a few important sources including Diebold Schilling, Die BernerChronik des Diebold Schilling, 1468-1484 2 vols. Gustav Tobler ed. (Bern: Wyss,
1897-1901). Hereafter cited as Schilling (Bern).
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in military tactics that helped change the character of the battlefield for
centuries to come. From that point, the armies of Europe relied more
heavily on infantry formations than was the case earlier in European
history, and the once-dominant cavalry became the auxiliary of men on
foot. This article will di scuss the character and actions of Charles the Bold
and address the nature of his
threat to Swiss independence .
Additionally, this essay will
deal with the Swiss military
and how it defeated one of the
most feared armies in Europe
at the battle of Murten and also
put in motion a major change
in military tactics. 3
Charles the Bold or
Charles le Temeraire (143377), better tran slated as
"Charles the Rash," ruled the
Duchy of Burgundy from 1467
to 1477. As an ambitious man ,
Charles sought to expand his
holdings and to create a strong,
centralized
state
between
France and the Holy Roman
Charles the Bold of Burgundy
Empire.4 By 1474,hecontrolled
( 1433-1477) takenfrom Ms. Statute
Alsace and the Franche-Comte ,
Book of the Order of the Golden
and he enjoyed an alliance
Fleece, Vienna ; painted between
with Savoy, which dominated
1518-1531.

3
Important rece nt studi es of the battl e inc lude, Gerrit Himmel sbac h , Die
Renaissance des Krieges: Kriegsmonographien und das Bild des Krieges in der
Spdtmittelalterlichen Chronistik am Beispiel der Burgunderkreige (ZUrich : Ch ro nos,
1999) and Georges G rosjean, " Die Murtensc hl ac ht , An a lyse eines Ere igni sses" in Die
Murtenschlacht: Ein Schweizer Ereignis in Europas Geschichte zwischen Mittelalter
und Ne uzeit 1476-1 976 , lnternationales Kolloquium (Freiburg: Paulusdruc kere i,
1976), pp . 35-90 .
4
The best study on Charl es in Engli sh is Ri chard Vaughan, Charles the Bold:
th e Last Valois Duke of Burgundy (London : Lo ngman, 1973). A valu able o ld study is
John Fos ter Kirk , History of Charles the Bold: Duke of Burgundy 3 vo ls . (Phil ade lphi a:
Lippo ncott , 1864- 1868).

10

February 20 l 0 SAHS Review

much of the Vaud region that later became part of Switzerland. 5 In
the late fifteenth century, these areas were on or near the borders of
the Swiss Confederation, and the Duke's territorial ambitions clearly
threatened the Swiss, making a clash between the two powers almost
inevitable.
Charles often used brutality as a means of intimidating his enemies
into submission, and the Duke earned a reputation for savagery.
Contemporaries often called him, "Charles the Terrible."6 King Louis
XI of France held him in disdain with good reason, and he stated that
Charles had little sense, was quick tempered, and conducted himself as
a "beast" (bestia). 7 This was certainly true when the Duke destroyed
entire regions of northern France in 1471 and burned 2,072 towns and
villages in the process. 8 Even if these numbers were exaggerated, this
action was clearly extensive even by the brutal standards of warfare in
that era . Charles said he ravaged and burned these areas, so they would
cause him "no trouble for a long time ." 9
In a celebrated incident, the Duke subdued the city of Liege in
1467, and he took away virtually all the laws, rights, charters, and
privileges of the community and its citizens. 10 When Liege continued to
resist his authority, Charles returned, took the town by assault on 30 Oct.
1468, and destroyed it. His men plundered all the houses, raped women,
5
R. J. Walsh, Charles the Bold and Italy (1467-1477): Politics and Personnel
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005).
6
Kirk , Charles , 2: 152; Ruth Putnam, Charles the Bold: Last Duke of Burgundy,
1433-1477 (New York: Putnam, 1908), p. 459; and Christopher Hare, Life of Louis XI:
the Rebel Dauphin and the Statesman King (London: Harper, 1907), p. 184.
7
"et da poco setimento, superbo, iracondo et a modo de una bestia." Alberic
Malleta au due de Milan 25 Dec. 1463 in Depeches des Ambassadeurs Milanais en
France (Paris: Renouard, 1915) 1: 361.
8
" Que par le raport du pruvost des marisal de /' ostel qui bail/oit par escrit a
mondit s. gr le due toutte /es vii/es qu 'on avoit arses, qu'on en ardy en some deux mi/le
septante deus que villes que villages." Jean de Hayn in, Les Memoires de Mess ire Jean
Seigneur de Haynin et de Louvegnier Chevalier 1465-1477 (Mons: Hoyois, 1842), p.
209. See also, Kirk, 2: 152 .
9
"J 'ay ards & briUe tout le pays de Caus, par maniere qu 'il ne nuira de /ongtemps, ny a vous ny a nous autres ."Charles the Bold "Lettre ... au Due de Bretagne,"
1472 as cited in Philippe de Comines, Memoires (Paris, Rollin, 1747) 2: 258. See also,
Vaughan, p. 81.
10
"Instrument notarie contenant la sentence prononce contre le pays de Liege"
as cited in L. P. Gachard, ed. Co/Leeton des documents inedits concernant l'histoire de
la Belgique 3 vols. (Bruzelles, Hauman, 1833-5) 2: 437-72 .
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tortured citizens, despoiled churches, murdered inhabitants, and burned
the community to the ground . Charles then refused to allow the city to
be rebuilt, and it remained uninhabited until after his death. 11
Nesle, a town in northeastern France, suffered a similar fate. After
the Duke's army took the position on 10 June 1472, his men went on a
killing spree, massacring the town's defenders. The troops only spared
a few enemy archers from death after they had cut off each man's
right hand. When the Duke entered a church on horseback, the animal
reportedly splashed through human blood on the floor, and Charles
bragged about the brutality of his men stating he had "many good
butchers" (moult bans bouchers) in his army. 12
The Duke's policy of harsh treatment of his enemies seemed
to have some military and political advantages, because many of the
cities near Liege chose to negotiate with him rather than resist and be
destroyed. In the case of Liege, the city's ability to assail him had been
crushed, and the town's inhabitants were unable to retaliate. Obviously,
the Duke thought that brutality was a worthwhile practice, and he later
used this policy against the Swiss but with disastrous results because
they had the ability to strike back.
The Swiss Confederation grew from three small states at the turn of
the thirteenth century to a coalition of eight mutually-dependent nations
by 1352. These Acht Alten Orte (eight old states) were the federation
that dominated the Swiss regions for much of the later Middle Ages. By
1474 when the war with Charles began, the Confederation had developed
into a complex system of alliances and subordinated areas to control
much of modern-day Switzerland from Lake Constance in the northeast
to lands beyond Lake Neuchatel in the west. The Duke's war with the
Swiss was an unwise venture from his standpoint. The Confederation
was a poor area with few resources and limited wealth. In fact, the most
important economic export of the Swiss was their mercenaries who had
earned a well-deserved reputation as effective soldiers in many armies

11

Philippe de Commynes, Memoirs, the Reign of Louis XI 1461-83, Michael
Jones trans. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), pp. 158-64. See also Vaughan, pp . 32-7; Kirk ,
I : 594-612; and liege et Bougogne: Actes du co/loque tenu a liege les 28 , 29, et 30
octobre 1968 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1972).
12
For the identical quotes, see Jean de Roye, Journal de Jean de Roye: comiu
le nom de Chronique Scandaleuse (Paris : Renourd, 1844) 2: 268-70 and Comines,
Memoires 2: 94-5 . See also, Kirk 2: 134-6 and Vaughan, pp. 77-80.
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in Europe . This made a successful conquest of the Swiss doubtful, and
such a victory would gain Charles few assets.13
The Swiss military system had matured by the middle of the fifteenth
century to be among the most admired in Europe. The Confederates were
primarily infantry, many wielding either the halberd or pike. Each was a
simple and effective weapon. The halberd was a wood shaft five to seven
feet in length with a spear point, hook, and ax blade affixed to it. The
halberdiers used the hook to snag the armor of a knight, so he could be
pulled from his mount, and they used the spear point for stabbing and the
ax blade for slashing. The pike was a spear eighteen feet in length that
was used to keep enemy cavalry at bay. 14
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Swiss had developed a
square (Viereck) tactical formation known as the Haufen (mass, great
number) which was designed to use the pike and halberd most effectively.
The Confederates placed three rows of pikemen on each of the four sides
of the structure where they could absorb the shock of attacking cavalry,
the length of their weapons keeping the knights from penetrating the
formation. The halberdiers were in the center of the Haufen and provided
tactical flexibility because they could rush past the pikemen and engage
an enemy in close combat. Men wielding an early musket, the harquebus,
also stood behind the pikemen providing firepower for the formation.
The Haufen was surprisingly mobile, and the Swiss often advanced over
rough terrain while maintaining good order. 15
Fear of the Duke's growing power brought many of the areas
threatened by him together in agreements for mutual support and military
aid. On 31 March 1474 the eight Swiss states joined an alliance, the Lower
Union (Niedere Vereinigung), composed of bishops, dukes, and cities
mostly in Alsace and Lorraine . Surprisingly, this agreement included the
Archduke of Austria, Sigismund, who was a member of the Habsburg
13

The most comprehensive history of Switzerland in English remains, James
Murray Luck,A History of Switzerland: The First 100,000 Years, Before the Beginnings
to the Days of the Present (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of Science and
Scholarship, 1985).
14
The classic study of Swiss Medieval warfare is, Carl von Elgger, Kriegswesen
und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossen im XIV., XV. und XVI . Jahrhundert
(Luzern: Militiirisches Verlagsbureau , 1873). For a discussion of weapons, see, pp .
91-4 .
15
Elgger, Kriegswesen, pp. 273-314. The Haufen was not developed from the
Greek Phalanx and any similarity between the two was coincidental.
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family, the traditional enemy of the Swiss. In fact, the mutual fear of
Charles led the Confederates to finalize a treaty, the Eternal Direction
(Ewige Rightung) with the Habsburgs on 14 Oct. 1474. 16
Soon after, the Executive Council (Tagsatzung) of the Swiss
Confederation, comprised of representatives from all eight states in the
Confederation, met in Luzern and formally declared war on Charles on 25
October 1474. The council wanted the Swiss to appear to be the wounded
party, and it listed the numerous incidents of maltreatment (misshandeln)
that Charles had perpetrated on the Confederates and their allies. The
declaration justified in advance any acts of war the Swiss would make on
the Duke and his holdings. 17
The first major engagement of the war was the battle of Hericourt on
13 November 1474. A large army of 18,000 men, including 7 ,570 Swiss,
laid siege to the city of Hericourt in the Franche-Comte controlled by
Charles. When a Burgundian army of 12,000 men attempted to break the
encirclement, the Confederates and their allies drove off the attackers
easily. Reportedly, only two Swiss were wounded. 18 The Burgundians
lost perhaps 3,000 men, and the Bernese counted 1,617 enemy dead. The
victory at Hericourt was an example of how the Swiss viewed the taking
of captives because Confederates were irritated by the fact that their allies
took 70 prisoners, since "it was their [the Swiss] custom to capture no
one." 19 But the Swiss also showed mercy to their adversaries. Hericourt
surrendered after three days of bombardment, and the Swiss allowed the
garrison of 450 men to leave unmolested and with their possessions. 20
Bern had long had a policy of territorial expansion, and the outbreak
of hostilities with the Burgundians gave that state and its allies the excuse
to invade the neighboring Vaud area which was controlled by Charles's
ally, Savoy. In three major campaigns during the spring, summer, and fall
of 1475, contingents from Bern, Fribourg, Solothurn, and later Zurich
attacked the communities and fortresses of the area eventually taking 16

16
Adolf Gasser, "Ewige Richtung und Burgunder Kriege: zur Ktarung einer
altern Streitfrage," in Ausgewiihlte historische Schriften 1933-1983 (Basel : Helbing,
1983),pp. 269-320.
17
Schilling (Bern), Berner-Chronik, 1: 174-5. See also Vaughan, pp. 293-4.
18
Heinrich Brennwald, Schweizerchronik, Rudlof Luginbiihl ed. 2 vols . (Basel:
Basler Buch- und Antiquariatshandlung, 1910) 2: 227-9.
19
"Dann ir gewonheit is, das si niemand ujnemen." Schilling (Bern), 1: 184.
20
Ibid., 180-5.
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towns and 43 castles.2 1 Typical of the warfare of the era, the raids involved
taking plunder and wanton destruction.
When the Swiss invaded the Vaud, they demanded the surrender of
opposing garrisons. If the defenders surrendered with little or no resistance,
they were treated well, but if they put up an impressive fight, the Swiss
often treated them harshly. When the Bernese took the town and castle
of Granson late in April 1475, they captured a ship full of people trying
to escape on Lake Neuchatel and let them go unharmed. The citizens of
the town soon surrendered, and the men of Bern let them leave uninjured
and carrying their possessions. 22 In October 1475, the citizens of Murten
refused entry to the forces of Bern and Fribourg. The besiegers warned
the people of the town that if they took the position by assault, they would
protect neither the lives nor the property of the defenders. The town soon
surrendered, and the Bernese and Fribourgers spared the people and their
possessions. 23 On the other hand, when the Bernese took the castle of
Grammont in the FrancheComte by assault in late
August 1475, they killed all
its defenders except a few
men who dressed as women
in a futile attempt to escape
detection .24
The war became more
cruel by the fall of 1475,
and the incidents of brutality
were more common on both
sides. When the Burgundians
took the fortress of Briey
m the France-Comte m

City Walls of Murten .
21

H. Kurz, Schweizerschlachten (Bern: Francke,1962), p . 89 . Schilling (Bern),
1: 317-9.
22
Schilling (Bern), 1: 217-9 and Johannes Knebel , Chronik aus den Zeiten des
Burgunderkrieges 2 vols . (Basel : Bahnmaier, 1851) , 1: 140.
23
Schilling (Bern) , 1: 290-1 . " ... und tet man nieman weder an libe noch an git nit."
24
Ibid , pp . 264-5 .
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September 1475, they captured the Swiss who had withstood a cannonade
for three days. When the Swiss capitulated, they gave the besiegers 12,000
Gulden, a huge sum, to save their lives. The Burgundians took the money
and assured the garrison they would be spared, but Charles ordered them
hanged. 25 The Duke vowed, "Thus will I do [the same] to all Swiss who
live where I want to enter." 26 Clearly, Charles would honor no deal to save
men's lives if they had offered resistance, and he set a brutal policy of
how he would deal with the Swiss.
When the men of Bern and Fribourg destroyed Estavayer in
October of 1475, part of their motivation might have been retaliation for
the executions at Briey. After a lengthy, difficult, and costly attack, the
Bernese and Fribourgers broke into the fortified town of Estavayer and
killed any man whom they thought had participated in the defense of the
fortress. The reports which stated that the Swiss killed 1,000 to 1,300
residents were much exaggerated because the town was too small to have
so many citizens in it, but the number of deaths was doubtless high. Some
defenders of the town fled to the Chenaux Castle in an attempt to save
their lives, but the Swiss stormed the fortress and killed its defenders,
only sparing a few young boys and one nobleman. 27
Even by the brutal standards of the day, the conduct of the men from
Bern and Fribourg in Estavayer was unacceptable. The leaders in Bern,
expressing fear that God and the Saints might be moved to take revenge
against them, soon wrote a strong denunciation of the acts of "inhuman
severity" (unmenschliche Hiirtigkeiten) of their troops. 28 When the dead
bodies were brought into the churches, there was a "great lamentation of
women and children whose husbands and fathers had been killed." The

25

Brennwald, Schweizerchronik 2: 240-1, mentioned no resistance and no
ransom and stated 300 Swiss were hanged. Others stated 80 Germans were killed
likely not noting the difference between Swiss and Germans. Heinrich Witte,
"Lothringen und Burgund," Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft far Lothringische Geschichte
und Alterthumskunde, Metz, 2 (1890): 72-3 and Emmanuel von Rodt, Die Feldziige
Karl des Kuhnen 2 vols. (Schaffbausen: Hurter,1843) I: 380-1.
26
Brennwald 2: 241. "Also wit [ich] alien den Scwitzeren tin, die da lebend, wo
ich si betreten mag!"
27
Schilling (Bern), I: 293-5. See also, Gemein hopthlt von Bern, Friburg und
Solodro, "missivam" to civibus Basiliensibus as cited in Hans Knebel, Tagebuch,
in Basler Chroniken 7 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1880) 2: 306-7 and Rodt, Feldziige, I:
525-8.
28
Bernische Anfi.ihrer, "Klagende Ausdriicke," as cited in Rodt, I: 531.
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Swiss troops soon became disturbed by their own brutality, and many of
them gave the bereaved women and children money to ease their losses.2 9
The attacks on the fortresses in the Vaud clearly threatened the
Duke's interests in the area, but a victory by the men of Valais, an ally
of Bern, over troops from Savoy on 13 November 1475 was much more
serious. This setback cut the essential supply lines through the St. Bernard
Pass and over the Alps, which Charles badly needed because he depended
on the reinforcements, supplies, and funds that reached him from Savoy
by that route. After he took the city of Nancy on 30 November 1475,
which ended his campaign in Alsace, he turned his attention to the Swiss
and reopening the pass.30 The Duke rashly launched an offensive in the
challenging conditions of winter rather than wait for warmer weather in
the spring.
Bern was Charles the Bold's major target for the initial phases of the
campaign. This state had been among the most aggressive against him,
and Bern 's defeat could bring the rest of the Duke's adversaries to terms.
Charles marched on Bern from the west and seized important fortresses
as he advanced. Taking these positions kept his supply lines open, and
it also kept any garrison from striking the rear of his forces. His army
was considered very large and numbered about 20,000 men. 31 It was very
formidable and included the much-feared and heavy-armored Burgundian
cavalry which could smash effectively into an enemy's columns . Charles
also had a large advantage in artillery which could reduce fortifications
and also cut down enemy troops.
The major weakness in the Burgundian army was its multi-ethnic
character. Charles hired mercenaries from various nations including English
archers, Italian cavalrymen, and German troops wielding harquebuses.
These contingents could be very effective, but they lacked cohesion
with other units, and their different languages caused communication
problems.32 In comparison, the Swiss had many advantages . While the

29

Schilling (Bern), I : 297. "gros iomer von frowen und kinden, denen ir manne
und viiter erslagen warent."
30
Jeune Huguenin, Histoire de la Guerre de Lorraine et du Siege de Nancy, par
Charles le Timeraurem due de Bourgogne 1473-1477 (Metz, Troubat, 1837).
31
Schilling (Bern) , 1: 354, note 1. G. Tobler quotes from letters of 13 and 17 Feb.
1476. The contemporary estimates of 40 to 60,000 men were much exaggerated.
32
Charles Oman , A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (London:
Methuen, 1924), 2: 265.
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Confederates had few cannon and little cavalry, their infantry was highly
effective, and their troops were similar in language and culture. They were
campaigning near their homelands, so they knew the terrain well, and
they had the additional motivation of defending their homes from foreign
invasion.
The Duke marched his forces to the castle of Granson, and he laid
siege to the fortress, his artillery pounding the position day and night. More
than five hundred men from Bern and Fribourg defended Granson, and
they successfully withstood attempts to storm their position on 18 and 21
February 1476. The resistance "horrified" (entsetzt) Charles and left him
eager for revenge. The Swiss began to lose courage when a cannon shot
blew the head off their "master of cannon" (bUchsenmeister), and when
much of their powder exploded. Their position was rapidly becoming
untenable, and, most significantly, they had no knowledge that their Swiss
compatriots were assembling a large army at Murten to come to their
aid .33
In despair, the troops in the fortress negotiated a surrender, even
though the Duke had a reputation for executing those who resisted him.
All the contemporary Swiss sources stated that Charles offered these men
their lives when they capitulated, but Panigarola, an Italian emissary with
the Duke, stated that no such assurance was given, and the men in Granson
placed themselves at the mercy of Charles. If so, it was a grievous mistake
because the Duke ordered their immediate execution. On 28 Feb. 1476,
the day of the surrender, 412 Swiss troops were led past Charles's tent as
he watched and were hanged on walnut trees in a scene which Panigarola
described as "shocking and horrible" and most certain to fill the Swiss
with terror. The remainder of the men in the garrison were drowned in
Lake Neuchatel on the following day, and the Duke again vowed to do the
same to all the Swiss who fell into his hands. 34
The Swiss army that assembled to relieve the garrison at Granson was
a formidable force of 20,376 men. Its numbers were carefully recorded to
assure that the plunder taken after the battle was evenly distributed. 35 The
army was divided into the traditional formations of three large squares
(Haufen). Each was arrayed in the typical fashion with rows of pikemen on
33

Schilling (Bern), I: 355-6.
"Panigarola an den Herzog von Mailand," 29 Feb . 1476 as cited in Wilhelm
Oechsli ed. Quellenbuch zur Schweizergeschichte (Zurich: Schulthess , 190 I) , p. 232.
Schilling (Bern) , I: 370-2 ; Brennwald, 2: 24 l; and Commynes, Memoirs, pp. 279-80 .
34
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Swiss Hanged and
Drowned at Granson
by Diebold Schilling
(Bern).

the outside of the formation with men wielding halberds and harquebuses
on the inside . This force advanced from Neuchatel and met Charles's
forces on 2 March 1476.36
The vanguard (Vorhut) of the Swiss army was relatively small and
numbered only about 1,500 men , mostly from Fribourg, Schwyz, and
Bern. The vanguard advanced more rapidly than the other, much larger
formations, and engaged the enemy first. As the Burgundi an forces
approached , the pious Swiss realized that their lives would soon be in
danger, so they knelt to pray, as was their custom before battle . When they
did so, they held their " arms apart" (mit zertanen armen). The opposing
kni ghts misunderstood thi s gesture as a sign of submission, and these men
rode forward shouting to the Swi ss, "You will get no mercy ; you must all
die." 37
35

Amtliche Sammlun g der ii/tern Eidgenoss ischen Abschiede, 8 vols . (Lucern :
We rner, 1858- 1874), 2: 593 . See also Vaughan, p. 375 .
36
The classic hi story of the batt le rem ains M . Feldmann , Die Schlachr bei
Grandson: ein Beitrag zur Kriegsgeschichte der Burgunderkriege (Frauenfe ld : Huber,
1902).
37
Brennwald , 2: 245. "Och geschicht kein gnad; ir mlssend a/le sterben." For
more on the prayers, see also Ulrich Meltinger to Base l as cited in the Basler Chroniken ,
2: 359, Schilling (Bern ), I : 377, and Gerold Edlibach, Chronik , (Ziirich : Meyer und
Zeller) , p. 150 .
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There was little planning on either side, and the two armies almost
stumbled upon each other. The advanced Burgundian cavalry struck the
Swiss vanguard, and brave knights threw themselves against the rows
of pikemen to little effect. At the same time, the Duke's army began
showering the Swiss with arrows and cannon shots inflicting many
casualties. Reportedly, the bowmen had enhanced the lethality of their
arrows by placing poison in the tips. 38
When Charles rode forward and saw the fighting, he made a logical
but ultimately an unwise decision. His forces had the Swiss vanguard
surrounded, and he attempted to reorder his men to make firing upon
the Confederates more efficient rather than renewing the costly cavalry
attacks. The Duke ordered some of his troops to withdraw on the flanks of
his enemies, so more cannon could be brought to bear on them. When the
Burgundian forces were pulling back, the main formation of Swiss troops
came into view, and Charles's men became frightened and confused at
the appearance of the unexpected forces. The withdrawal then turned to
panic. Some men yelled, "Save yourselves if you can," and the entire
army fled. Charles bravely rode among his men urging them to stay and
fight, but he was unsuccessful, and he soon fled as well. 39
Losses on both sides were minor, and each suffered no more than
a few hundred casualties, but the battle of Granson was still highly
significant. The Swiss had defeated one of the most impressive armies in
Europe and captured the Burgundian camp where they found much booty.
These spoils included tents, furniture, supplies, relics, cups of silver and
gold, large amounts of money, and artistic treasures such as intricate
"7
tapestries. The troops also found precious stones including
large diamonds and 7 large rubies." A significant piece of jewelry was an
"exquisite diamond, whose great worth no one could measure, [being]
half the size of a walnut, [and being] set in gold." 40 Most importantly
for military purposes, the Swiss captured 420 large cannon, 800 smaller
cannon, hundreds of tons of gunpowder, thousands of horses, and many
thousands of infantry weapons including battle axes, pikes, and bows and
arrows. 41
38 Schilling

(Bern), I: 377-81.
Panigarola "an den Herzog von Mailand," 4 March 1476 in Oechsli (1901), p. 233 .
40
Schilling (Bern) I: 384-8 . This might have been the Sancy diamond, which was
53 carats in weight. See W.R. Cattelle The Diamond (New York: Lane, 1911), pp. 78-9.
41
Florens Deuchler, Die Burgunderbeute (Bern: Stampfli, 1963).
39
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When the Swiss found the bodies of 412 of their countrymen still
hanging from the trees near Granson, they were filled with remorse and
rage . An eyewitness described the scene:
"There one found sadly the honorable men still freshly hanged on
the trees in front of the castle [of Granson] whom the tyrant [Charles the
Bold] had hanged. That was a wretched, pitiable sight. There were hung
ten or twenty men on one bough. The trees were bent down and were
completely full. There hanged a father and son next to each other, there
two brothers or other friends . And there came the honorable men who
knew them; who were their friends, cousins, and brothers, who found
them miserably hanging. There was at first anger and distress in crying
and bewailing." 42

The Bernese and Fribourgers felt the loss most intensely because it
was largely their men who had been killed, but many other Swiss were
deeply angered by the atrocity. Rather than break their will to oppose
him, the Duke's actions at Granson united the Swiss as never before in
a common cause of resistance and revenge. The first to feel the wrath
of the Confederates was a force of about thirty Burgundians who had
fled to the castle of Granson. When the Bernese took the castle, they
either hanged or threw twenty-eight men down from the castle towers.
Only a few young boys and one nobleman were spared. The man was
exchanged for a Swiss captive.43
After the victory at Granson, the Swiss failed to pursue the Duke's
disorganized forces and eradicate them. Bern, who feared the return
of the army, vainly tried to convince its allies to pursue their defeated
enemy, and the Swiss contingents remained for only three or four more
days before they returned home. 44 Bern 's warning was correct, and the
Duke soon made another attempt to invade the Swiss Confederation.
Charles withdrew to Lausanne where he reorganized his forces for
further action, showing much energy and resolve. He soon wrote to "all
the world to come to him with all [its] cannon and all [its] manpower." 45
Charles ordered the city of Dijon to send all its artillery, and he had the
42
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church bells and anything made of copper in his lands melted into cannon.
He also ordered the city of Nancy and the duchy of Luxembourg to send
him all their artillery, so he would have "sixty times more [guns], as
he said, than he had lost." 46 His allies, including Savoy, Milan, Venice,
Aragon, and the pope, soon granted him funds, weapons, and men. For
two months, the forces came to Charles's camp from numerous areas
including Italy, Germany, Flanders, Burgundy, England, and Poland.
This army was nearly the size of the force Charles deployed at Granson,
and it probably numbered from 19 to 22,000 men.47
These troops soon showed much indiscipline and brutality, and
there were one or two brawls among the men every day. In one riot,
125 men from Italy and Germany were killed. The soldiers killed many
local people, and so thoroughly plundered and burned the area within
twenty miles of their camp that they could no longer get supplies from
the region and had to advance or withdraw. While Bern was the major
objective of the campaign, Charles first attacked the fortress of Murten
to remove any threat to his rear. On 27 May, the army began its slow
march to Murten, roughly 45 miles away. The advance took 14 days,
averaging only 3 miles a day, and the army arrived on 9 June to begin
the. siege.48
The Duke's attack on Murten was most unfortunate for him.
The town was on the shores of Lake Murten, and Charles could not
invest the position because he had no flotilla on the lake. Supplies and
reinforcements reached the garrison in the fortress throughout the siege.
Most importantly, besieging Murten meant that the Duke had to deploy
his forces near the lake, some facing the town and some facing any
Swiss advance. If his forces were dislodged, the logical line of retreat
was directly into the lake. Napoleon Bonaparte visited Murten in 1797.
He examined the battlefield and learned how the Duke had deployed
his forces. The general was highly critical and stated, "Charles the Bold
must have been a great madman!" 49 He explained, "If we ever offered
46
" Le Due de Bourgogne aux Magistrats de Dijon," 8 Mar. 1476 in 0 ., p. 17 and
Panigarola "an den Herzog von Mailand," 4 Mar. 1476 in Oechsli (1901), p. 234.
47
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49
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battle in this place, be persuaded that we would not use the Jake as [an
avenue] for retreat." 50
The renewed threat from Charles motivated the Executive Council
of the Swiss Confederation to redefine its rules of war, which were first
stated in the Sempach Letter (Sempacherbrief) of 1393. These laws
included a prohibition of plundering until the conclusion of battle and
then only with the permission of leaders, rules for the distribution of
booty, a charge strictly forbidding the Swiss to fight among themselves,
a statement that the Swiss wounded should be tended, and a strict
admonition that no one should flee from battle. These orders protected
churches, women, and children, but not men because they were potential
combatants. 51 On 18 March 1476, the Executive Council repeated many
of the former stipulations, but it placed a new emphasis on conduct
against adversaries. It ordered the troops , "so far as possible to kill our
enemies" and stated that no prisoners be taken while a battle was still
in progress. 52 These rules gave the Swiss troops a legal justification for
their brutal actions at the battle of Murten .
Murten was a fortified town with high walls , and the position
could delay the Duke 's advance until the Swiss could assemble their
troops for battle. The city council of Bern chose Adrian von Bubenberg,
an experienced soldier, to lead the defenders of the stronghold, and he
arrived with fifteen hundred Bernese troops on 9 April. 53 The town had
numerous weapons including many cannon and an ample supply of
gun powder, and additional supplies reached the position across Lake
Murten throughout the siege. Every man knew his duties, and Buben berg
allowed no dissent. If anyone complained or advocated surrender, he
was to be killed to separate the cowardly form the courageous. The
Bernese constructed entrenchments and bastions near the two gates of
the town, and, in an impressive act of bravado, Bubenberg ordered
these gates left open day and night during the entire siege forcing the
garrison to be on constant alert for attack. Bubenberg also ordered his
men to sally out to engage the besiegers of the town. This policy started
50
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Adrian
von
Bubenberg
enters Murten
by Schilling
(Bern).
when Charles's army first arrived at the fortress on 9 June, and 250
men of the garrison attacked the Duke's troops killing 50 of them. 54
During the siege, the Burgundians shot arrows into the fortress
with notes attached warning of the consequences of resistance. "You
peasants, surrender the city and castle ... . We will soon take the city,
and will capture you , kill [you], hang [you] by the neck." 55 The Swiss
knew they would be killed if they capitulated, and the Duke's brutality
had increased their willingness to resist. Charles never learned this fact,
and he continued his remorseless practices. As described by Panigorola,
who was with the Brugundians , "The Duke had all the villages in the
area burned down .... [and] the Duke hanged all the Swiss that he
captured ." 56
The Burgundians were stationed two bowshots (about 400 to 500
yards) from the walls of the fortress but were still subject to heavy
cannon fire day and night from the town's artillery. Early in the siege,
a Burgundian commander ordered his men "under the threat of death"
to attack the fortress and be standing in front of the city gates by dawn.
But that morning, the soldiers were still far from the walls because the
54
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heavy fire from the Bernese cannon had kept them away. The Duke's
men then began to dig entrenchments at night in a zigzag pattern that
would allow the troops to move slowly towards the town walls as the
trenches progressed. 57
While the smaller guns of the Burgundians shelled Murten for days,
the heaviest cannon (houptbuchsen) did the greatest damage when they
arrived and were placed in use on l 7 June. After the first four shots, a
main tower in the walls around the fortress collapsed. The people of the
town tried to rebuild their damaged fortifications at night 1 but the guns
continued to wreck their defenses. On the next day, the garrison counted
seventy cannon balls that had been fired into the town, and the guns soon
knocked down the wall on one side of the fortress. 58
Charles ordered an assault on Murten that evening, l 8 June, to
exploit the breach in the walls. The attackers advanced with great
shouts, and they carried ladders and axes to help them storm the
position, but the garrison had placed their guns at the most exposed
· sections of the walls and drove their enemies away. The Swiss "defended
themselves very well," and the Burgundians lost from 200 to l ,000
men. 59 Bubenberg also stated that each man in the town had conducted
himself in a courageous and obedient manner. 60 But the garrison was
still in grave danger, and the defenders sent a message to Bern on 19
June stating they were nearly in an exposed position, questioning their
ability to hold out. If the artillery pounded down more towers and walls
of the fortress, then the garrison would have only their bodies with
which to defend the town. 61 Clearly, Charles would take the position
unless aid came in time.
In his obvious disdain for the lower classes, the Duke failed to
appreciate how vigorously a nation comprised largely of free men
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with military prowess would respond to his invasion. The Swiss
fought to protect their homes, lands, and their highly-prized liberties
and privileges. They knew well the severe cost of defeat, and they
reacted with impressive strength to the threat. Large Swiss armies soon
assembled near Bern, and the forces of Unterwalden, Luzern, Uri, and
Schwyz, presented themselves on 18 June 1476 . Troops from Basel,
Fribourg, Solothurn, Biel , Zug, Glarus, and contingents of knights
on horseback from Lorraine, Strasbourg, and various areas of Alsace
soon came as well. Many of these men marched night and day to meet
the Burgundian threat and raise the siege of Murten. 62 While some
forces, largely from St. Gallen, were still expected to arrive, the Zurich
contingent was viewed as essential to the war effort, and no major attack
was undertaken until it arrived. Hans Waldmann commanded Zurich's
forces of 2,000 men. They left the city on 19 June, also marching night
and day, and they met the rest of the army in the evening of 21 June
at the bridge at Gtimmenen, having walked roughly eighty-five miles
in three days. Hundreds of exhau sted men fell out before they reached
their goal, but when the other Zurichers arrived, the army was then
assembled for action.63
The size of the Swiss army at the battle of Murten was probably
larger than the force at Granson . Panigorola stated he talked with two
prominent Swiss prisoners after the battle at Murten who told him
that there were 30,000 men on foot and 1,600 on horseback with the
army. 64 Recent historians have estimated the size of the Swiss infantry
at nearly 24,000 men. 65 Bern was most threatened by the invasion,
and it sent the largest contingent of men, fielding about 7 ,800 troops,
including the garrison of 1,500 or more men in Murten. This was most
impressive because it represented about three quarters of the estimated
10 to 11,000 adult males available for military service in the state. 66
62
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The Burgundians built a barrier, the "green hedge" (grunhag)
or palisade, to stop any Swiss advance from the direction of Bern.
The men dug trenches, constructed fences, and placed many cannon
to fortify the position, and Charles hoped his artillery and bowmen
would destroy the Swiss before they could break through it. 67 Professor
Grosjean has argued that the Duke's men also constructed a line jutting
out from the palisade from which to fire into the flank of the Swiss
when they advanced. Grosjean estimated that "at least 100-150 cannon
were placed there." 68 These guns did the most damage to the Swiss
forces during the battle.
The Swiss and their allies planned to attack on Saturday 22 June
1476, a holy day on the Christian calendar known as the "day of ten
thousand knights" (zehntausend Rittertag) or day of the "Ten Thousand
Martyrs." 69 The commanders of the various forces met in a war council
the morning of the engagement to decide on a course of action and
how to deploy their troops. 70 Wilhelm Herter placed the forces in order
for battle, but there was probably no overall commander since such a
position was against Swiss custom and practice. Once the battle was
joined, the various commanders over smaller units were supposed to
lead their men and make sure that they carried out their assignments. 71
The Swiss were arrayed in three large battle formations. The
"vanguard" (Vorhut) comprised roughly five thousand men chiefly
from Bern, Fribourg, and Schwyz. Likely, the Bernese stood in the
first lines of this configuration because they were motivated to fight
well, to lift the siege of Murten, and to save their fellow countrymen.
In the center of the vanguard stood men carrying harquebuses and
crossbows, and pikemen were placed on the sides of the configuration.
Hans van Hallwil, a respected military leader and citizen of Bern, led
the vanguard, and heavy cavalry numbering 1,500 knights, largely
from Alsace, accompanied the disposition. The "main mass" formation
67
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Battle of Murten by Schilling (Luzern). Upper left: the Swiss attack.
Lower right: the Burgundians are slaughtered.
(Gewalthaufen) was comprised of 10,000 or more men. The principal
banners of the Swiss states stood in the center of this formation protected
by rows of men wielding halberds and by pikemen in contingents of
1,000. The final configuration was the "rearguard" (Nachhut), led by
Kaspar von Hertenstein of Luzern. This formation was considered
"large and powerful" (gros und stark), but it was not more carefully
described. Likely, it was arrayed similar to the "main mass" with rows
of halberdiers and men with pikes. 72
A heavy rain storm struck in the middle of the night before the
battle, and the severe weather made a Swiss attack seem unlikely.
Charles allowed most of his men to remain in their various camps
around Murten in the morning, and the Burgundian positions were
seriously undermanned when the Confederates struck them. The Duke
made significant errors at the beginning of the battle. He had failed to
make a proper reconnaissance of the Swiss forces, knew little about the
size and disposition of the opposing army, and reacted slowly when he
learned of the enemy approach. Only when the vanguard of the Swiss
72
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army advanced from the forest did the Duke order his men to their
positions. Many of his troops were putting on their armor and running
to their place in battle when the Confederates struck their lines. Charles
was also slow to don his armor and to mount his horse. His indecision
meant that his army was poorly prepared to meet the attack, and he
was not at the scene when his leadership was most needed. By the
time he was ready for action, his army was already fleeing from the
enemy. 73
The Swiss marched through the forest during the heavy rain, but
the storm abated when they finally broke clear of the trees in the early
afternoon, and it was "a beautiful, bright day." 74 The vanguard with
the cavalry on its flank halted briefly to adjust their lines, and they
came under heavy fire from the Burgundian cannon shooting from the
fortified "green hedge" position. The artillery fire was so heavy that it
fell "thick as hail." 75 The cannon shots blew gaps in the Swiss formations
and mutilated the knights on horseback. An eyewitness described the
scene.
"The enemy had strengthened [their position] well and shot
[their], first-rate large cannon exceptionally well ... against the
Confederates and their formations [also] against the knights, . . .
and they did great damage [to them]. Then I, Peterman Etterlin, the
composer of this chronicle, and many other pious man who were
there, saw some cavalrymen and knights shot in two at the middle so
that the top part was blown away and the bottom part remained in the
saddle . The same happened to some whose head [was blown] off." 76

While some of the wounds were ghastly, the losses were relatively
few, and the Swiss soon filled in the spaces in their formations and
continued to advance. The Burgundian artillery was highly effective, but
the guns were cumbersome to reload, and their rate of fire was too slow
to stem the attack. The vanguard and the "main mass" (Gewalthaufen)
advanced toward the weakest points of the green hedge, which were
roads that led through the position for egress and entry. Even though
these gaps were narrow and could only accommodate three or four
horses abreast, they were weak points where the line could be breached .
73
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When the Swiss approached , the Burgundians counter attacked with
their cavalry, but the numbers of knights on horseback were too few to
change the course of battle, and they killed only 10 or 12 enemy. 77 The
fight at the green hedge was brief as the Swiss stormed the position,
and the artillerymen were the first to be cut down .78 The Swiss struck
hard against their enemies , slashing and thrusting with their weapons,
as they cut their way into the Burgundian forces. The Confederates
overwhelmed the badly outnumbered forces at the green hedge and
broke through. Charles's cavalry made one last attempt to stem the
tide, but the counterattack was weak, and it failed. The garrison in
Murten also joined the battle and rushed out of the fortress to attack
their enemy's rear. The Duke's army soon fell apart and took to a "most
shocking and most disgraceful flight." 79
The Burgundians ran
for safety, but many were
cut down as the Swiss
showed no mercy, took no
prisoners, and killed every
man they could . Numerous
Burgundian soldiers made
pathetic attempts to save
their lives. Panigarola
saw men throw off their
helmets and lie on the
ground with their arms
crossed showing that the
Swiss could easily bind
them as captives. 80 They
were all killed. Many
men had no recourse but
to retreat into the waters
The Attack on the Green Hedge at Murten
of Lake Murten , and " an
by Evert Van Muyden.
unspeakably large number
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[of men were] forced into the lake and drowned." 81 Some waded out
into the lake until the water reached their necks and chins, and they
threw away their weapons and begged to be spared. The Confederates
stabbed the men they could reach from the shore, and the Swiss also
took boats onto the lake to continue to kill the men in the water. A few
of the Burgundians might have taken off their armor and swam the two
miles across the lake to survive, but the rest of the troops in the lake
drowned or were killed. 82
Some of the Burgundian troops climbed walnut trees to get out
of the reach, and the Swiss shot them down with their harquebuses
and hand cannon like they were so many squirrels or birds. The
Confederates also used their long pikes to stab these men who were
hiding among the branches. Ironically, the garrison at Granson had
been hanged on walnut trees, and the Swiss partially avenged those
executions by killing soldiers hiding in the same variety of plants.
A few of the Duke's men tried to hide in baker ovens in nearby
villages, while others hid in houses and huts. Some of the buildings
were set on fire, and all the men were killed. 83 Many women were
among the Duke's men wearing armor. They were likely prostitutes
who wore men's clothing to hide their gender, and many of them
had to show their genitals and breasts to the Swiss to prove they
were women and avoid being killed. 84 The Swiss fished the corpses
of their enemies out of the lake and buried them in two large pits
with the men killed on the land. Their bones were later placed in an
ossuary (Beinhaus).
Many Swiss no doubt sought revenge for the Duke's execution
of the garrison at Granson and also for the wanton destruction of lands
and people when his army advanced into the Confederation. But a
reason is never an excuse for misconduct, and the Confederates were
no more justified in killing these hapless men than was the Duke in his
many acts of brutality. The Swiss clearly showed their ferocity and sent
a grave warning to anyone invading their lands, but they gained little
or no military or political advantages from this carnage. The fleeing
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troops posed no threat to the Swiss, and many of the knights were
valuable resources because they could have been held for ransom.
Certainly, the dead could never again menace the Confederation, but
the loss of these troops hardly prevented Charles from raising another
army, hiring other mercenaries, and again threatening the interests of
the Confederation. Clearly, there would have been difficulties and much
expense to house and feed large numbers of prisoners for any length
of time, but these problems were solvable, and the captives could have
been sheltered and released later under favorable terms . Swiss brutality
also caused animosity between nations for centuries as demonstrated
by the conduct of French soldiers who conquered Switzerland in 1798.
A portion of these men was from the Burgundian areas of France, and
they took some small revenge on the Swiss by destroying the ossuary
at Murten. 85
The victorious Confederates seized the Burgundian camp and
took large amounts of booty including many weapons and hundreds of
cannon. While the captured materials never reached the impressive haul
taken at Granson, the Swiss seized many textiles, much merchandise ,
and large amounts of money. 86 No precise tally of the dead at Murten
was made, and the total losses on both sides have been subject to
considerable speculation. But the Burgundian losses were severe, and
the estimates of the dead ranged largely from 6,000 to 30,000. 87 The
higher conjectures were exaggerations because the numbers probably
exceeded the size of the Duke 's army. The most accurate numbers were
likely presented by the men on the scene who had the opportunity to
examine the battlefield and see the dead. Most of them stated that about
10,000 men had died. 88 In comparison , the Swiss losses were small,
and most accounts reported that the numbers of dead were a few score
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or no more than several hundred. 89
When his army crumbled at Murten, Charles the Bold joined his
men and fled to save his life. He rode for days and finally stopped
when he reached Gex. Despite his severe defeat, Charles regained his
old optimism. He joked, reorganized his forces, and planned further
campaigns, but his fortunes never recovered. He was completely cut
off from Savoy, he had lost the Vaud, and his army was never again
as large as the one destroyed at Murten. 90 In January 1477, the Duke
again laid siege to Nancy. A coalition of forces gathered to meet him,
and he was badly outnumbered when the battle took place on 5 January.
Many Swiss were among his enemies, and they played a prominent
role in routing his army. Charles was killed in the retreat. His body was
found days later, stripped of its clothing, and his face had been partially
eaten by wolves or dogs. Most of the Duke's ambitions died with him
because he had no forceful heir to take his place, and the power of
Burgundy, which he had so ruthlessly enhanced, soon faded when his
adversaries tried to subvert the prerogatives of his patrimony and take
his possessions.91
The spectacular Swiss success at Murten was much celebrated,
and historians have long considered it one of the most lopsided and
influential victories in European history . As Vaughan stated, it was, "one
of the most destructive and decisive battles in the military history of the
middle ages." 92 In the scope of military history, Murten foreshadowed a
new era of warfare because it demonstrated the effectiveness of men on
foot. This helped set in motion a revolution in military tactics in which
infantries became more important than the heavily armored knight
on horseback. Hans Delbriick, a prominent military historian, stated
that Murten was the greatest turning point in military tactics since the
battle of Marathon in 490 BC .93 This victory of free men had a social
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impact as well because it contributed to the decline of feudalism. As
Rudolf Steiner stated, perhaps with some exaggeration, "The defeat of
Charles the Bold in the battle of Murten was an extremely significant
symptom for it gave the death blow to chivalry." 94 The victory also
became a symbol of Swiss national pride and determination in which
they demonstrated their strength, resolve, organization, and skill. The
Swiss had preserved their independence, confirmed their national
identity, demonstrated the viability of the Swiss Confederation and,
in the process, had destroyed one of the most powerful and ruthless
leaders in all Europe.
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